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Introduction
Good name in man or woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls;
Who steals my purse steals trash; tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.'
Consistent with the individualistic social ethos pervading American
life is the belief that all persons have a right to be left alone, a "right to
privacy."2 Although such a right was relatively late in developing,3 most
jurisdictions now recognize a common-law right of privacy and tort ac-
tions for violations of that right.4 Courts and commentators generally
divide the right to privacy into four categories: unreasonable intrusion
upon another's seclusion and private affairs, public disclosure of embar-
rassing private facts about another person, publicity which places an-
other in a false light, and appropriation of another's name or likeness for
one's own advantage.'
The last of these four rubrics has developed into a separate doctrine,
which many courts call the "right of publicity." The right of publicity
makes actionable the use of a person's name or likeness (i.e., picture)
without his or her consent.6 The doctrine is typically applied when a
person's name or likeness, usually a celebrity's or public figure's, is ap-
propriated in a commercial context to advertise a product or service.
1. William Shakespeare, Othello, Act III, Scene 3.
2. "[T]he right to privacy has been defined as the right to be let alone." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A comment a (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see also W.
PROSSER, & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 117 at 849 (5th ed. 1984).
3. A common-law right of privacy was unknown in the United States or England before
1890. The right of privacy was first asserted academically by Samuel Warren and Louis Bran-
deis in the noted article, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). For the history of
the courts' recognition of a legal right of privacy, see generally W. PROSSER & P. KEETON,
supra note 2 § 117; Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
4. "One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting
harm to the interests of the other." RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652A(l). In some jurisdic-
tions, the right of privacy is statutory. See infra note 82.
5. Prosser, supra note 3, at 398. The Restatement makes virtually the same fourfold
categorization. It states,
The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another .... or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness,. . . or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life .... or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652A(2).
6. The Restatement has defined what many courts call (as will this Article) the "right of
publicity" in the following terms: "One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name
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The emergence of the right of publicity as a distinct doctrine is not
surprising, as it plainly serves different interests from the three other
types of right of privacy actions. The first three categories of the right to
privacy tort generally protect a person's right "to be let alone" and guard
against injuries to an individual's feelings or reputation as a result of un-
wanted, excessive, or false publicity. The right of publicity, on the other
hand, protects a public figure's pecuniary interest in the commercial ex-
ploitation of his identity.7 Indeed, many commentators view the right of
publicity not as a privacy concern at all, but rather as a form of property
right.
The traditional application of the doctrine extended protection only
to an individual's name or likeness. That is, only appropriations of one's
name or likeness could be actionable, not uses of other aspects of iden-
tity. However, the law has now begun to recognize that characteristics
other than name or likeness may identify a person sufficiently for him or
her to claim the exclusive right to control their use. For example, a fa-
mous actor's or singer's distinctive voice may be such that its imitation
immediately brings to mind the person imitated. Likewise, a prominent
celebrity's unique appearance, dress, hairstyle, or clothing may be imi-
tated so that the audience believes the actual celebrity is present. What is
common to all these situations is an attempt to appropriate or exploit
another's identity, usually for commercial ends.
In recent years the right of publicity doctrine has been extended to
protect from appropriation many characteristics of identity beyond
merely name or likeness. While liberalizing the doctrine beyond its origi-
nal formulation in this manner may appear to be more responsive to the
fundamental goal of protecting the integrity of identity, discarding the
relative certainty of the name or likeness standard creates new difficul-
ties. The range of permissible expression is necessarily limited once the
right of publicity is expanded. A vague, diffuse protection for identity
or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy." RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 2, § 652C.
Although it was not the first case applying the doctrine, the term "right of publicity" was
apparently coined by Judge Jerome Frank in Haelen Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum,
202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). The case involved a contract
dispute between a chewing gum company and a baseball player and the use of his photograph
on baseball cards sold with the gum. The court stated that "a man has a right in the publicity
value of his photograph," a "right of publicity." 202 F.2d at 868; see Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 842 n.6 (6th Cir. 1983) (dissenting opinion) (the right of
publicity did not "emerge" until 1953).
7. See Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42
BROOKLYN L. REV. 527 (1976). The U.S. Supreme Court accepted this distinction between
the general right of privacy and the right of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Brdcst.
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1980).
8. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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inevitably chills the portrayal of public figures and grants public figures
an unregulated monopoly over the use of various "attributes" of identity,
a monopoly that may not be deserved. Moving beyond the traditional
strictures of name or likeness in order to protect the misappropriation of
identity has thus proven to be problematic.
This Article discusses the scope of the right of publicity and the
desirability of expanding the protection afforded by the doctrine beyond
its original boundaries of name or likeness. Recent developments in the
case law are first explored and then an analysis of the proper scope of the
doctrine is undertaken.
I
The Developing Case Law: The Emerging Protection
for "Attributes of Identity"
In the last decade, considerable litigation has occurred concerning
the scope and boundaries of the right of publicity. Courts have come to
recognize that there are many ways to appropriate an individual's iden-
tity, beyond merely using one's name or a picture of one's face. Advertis-
ers have known this truth for many years and have applied this
knowledge in many creative ways to advertise products. This advertising
led to increased litigation by aggrieved public figures, which in turn
forced the courts to confront the issue of appropriation. While, in gen-
eral terms, the courts have expanded the right of a publicity action to
extend beyond name or likeness appropriation, this expansion of the tort
has occurred inconsistently among different jurisdictions, both in its doc-
trinal formulation and its logical basis.9 A review of several leading right
of publicity decisions illustrates both the abandonment of the traditional
name or likeness limitation and the difficulties in formulating a new defi-
nition of precisely what the "right of publicity" should protect.
A. Slogan As an Attribute of Identity: Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc.
A recent leading decision that addresses the scope of the right of
publicity doctrine, albeit in rather unique circumstances, is Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. " In Carson, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit confronted the issue of whether a company
9. Former Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court noted that "the develop-
ment of [the right of publicity] has been spasmodic." Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d
813, 837 n.14, 603 P.2d 425, 439 n.14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 338 n.14 (1979) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
10. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
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that sold portable toilets violated a prominent entertainer's right of pub-
licity by using a phrase associated with him in the name of its product.
The plaintiffs in this case were the prominent entertainer and televi-
sion talk show host, Johnny Carson, and also Johnny Carson Apparel,
Inc. Carson was a major stockholder of Carson Apparel and had li-
censed it to use his name and picture on its product and advertising
materials. Johnny Carson has achieved national prominence as the host
of the popular television program The Tonight Show, which broadcasts
nationwide five nights a week on NBC. From the time he began hosting
The Tonight Show in 1962, Carson has been introduced every night by
the words "Here's Johnny." Carson never registered the phrase "Here's
Johnny" as a trademark or service mark, although in 1977, Carson Ap-
parel, Inc. granted a license to Marcy Laboratories to use the phrase as
the name of a line of men's toiletries."'
The defendant, a Michigan corporation formed in 1976, sold and
rented portable toilets. As well as using the phrase "Here's Johnny" in
its corporate name, the defendant named its product the "Here's Johnny
Portable Toilet." The defendant's founder admitted he adopted this
name for his product fully aware that "Here's Johnny" was the introduc-
tion for Carson on The Tonight Show. He stated that he coupled the
phrase "Here's Johnny" with another, "the world's foremost com-
modian," to make "a good play on a phrase."' 12
Carson apparently was not amused.' 3 He sued the defendant in fed-
eral court in Michigan, claiming unfair competition, trademark infringe-
ment, and invasion of privacy and publicity rights because of the
defendant's use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" without his consent. Car-
son sought damages from the defendant's resulting profits and an injunc-
tion prohibiting the defendant's further use of the phrase.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan entered
judgment in favor of the defendant corporation and ordered the suit dis-
missed.' 4 On the unfair competition and trademark infringement claims,
the court held that Carson failed to satisfy the "likelihood of confusion"
test.15 With respect to the invasion of privacy and right of publicity theo-
11. Id. at 833.
12. Id.
13. The court of appeals commented, "Clearly, the association does not appeal to Car-
son's sense of humor." Id. at 834.
14. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71, 78 (E.D. Mich.
1980).
15. This test states that unfair competition and trademark infringement are present if, as a
result of the defendant's conduct, the public is likely to believe that the product was originated
by, or sponsored by, the plaintiff, thereby creating a "likelihood of confusion." Id. at 74 (citing
Societe Comptoir De L'Industrie v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1962); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938)).
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ries, the trial judge followed the traditional rule that the right of publicity
only protects appropriation of a "name or likeness" and that "Here's
Johnny" did not so qualify. The judge stated that it "would not be pru-
dent to allow recovery for a right to publicity claim [that] does not more
specifically identify Johnny Carson." 16 Carson appealed the judgment
against him to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
In a two-to-one decision, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court. The court of appeals upheld the lower court's disposition of the
unfair competition and trademark issues, but held that Carson's right of
publicity had been violated by the defendant's use of the phrase "Here's
Johnny."
The majority's analysis of the right to privacy claim began with a
discussion of the established fourfold classification of the tort, as dis-
cussed above. The court noted that "the right of privacy and the right of
publicity protect fundamentally different interests and must be analyzed
separately."1 It then stated, with little further explanation, that "the
facts here presented do not . . . amount to an invasion of any of the
interests protected by the [first three types of] right of privacy. ' 8
Purporting to apply Michigan law, which had not yet addressed the
right of publicity, 9 the majority set forth a new formulation of the right
of publicity doctrine. It rejected the trial court's approach, which fol-
lowed the rule enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 0 that
limited the right of publicity to protecting only against appropriation of
one's name or likeness.2' The majority found such a doctrine to be "too
narrow" 22 because "a celebrity's legal right of publicity is invaded when-
ever his identity is intentionally appropriated for commercial pur-
poses."'23  The court concluded that "[i]f the celebrity's identity is
commercially exploited [without that celebrity's consent], there has been
an invasion of the right [of publicity], whether or not his name or like-
ness is used."2 4
16. Id. at 78.
17. Carson, 698 F.2d at 834.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652C; see also W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note
2, § 117, at 851 n.20 (Prosser, however, implies that the "name or likeness" limitation on what
is protected by the right of publicity need not always be followed).
21. The court of appeals assumed, as does this discussion, that using the phrase "Here's
Johnny" was not to be considered an appropriation of Carson's name, as the name "Johnny"
alone did not identify Johnny Carson.
22. Carson, 698 F.2d at 835.
23. Id. at 837 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 835.
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Applying this new "identity" test, the majority first found that "the
phrase 'Here's Johnny' is generally associated with Carson by a substan-
tial segment of the television viewing public,"25 making the phrase
"Here's Johnny" part of Carson's public identity. Second, the court
found that the defendant intentionally used the phrase because of its as-
sociation with Carson. The president of the defendant corporation ad-
mitted that he knew that for years the phrase introduced Carson on
television. The defendant's counsel, in fact, agreed to stipulate before
trial that the words "Here's Johnny" were publicly associated with
Johnny Carson.26 The court thus reached the conclusion that "the
'Here's Johnny' name was selected by [the defendant's president] because
of its identification with Carson."27 Since the phrase was appropriated
for the defendant's commercial purposes, all the elements of the major-
ity's new test for determining violations of the right of publicity were
satisfied. The majority held, therefore, that "Carson's right of publicity
was invaded because appellee intentionally appropriated his identity for
commercial exploitation. 28
The court of appeals majority was quite explicit in stating the policy
basis for its expansion of the protection offered by the right of publicity.
The court stressed that the right of publicity existed to protect a public
figure's exclusive right to exploit the pecuniary value of his public iden-
tity. It reasoned,
The right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest
of celebrities in their identities. The theory of the right is that a celeb-
rity's identity can be valuable in the promotion of products, and the
celebrity has an interest that may be protected from the unauthorized
commercial exploitation of that identity .... "The famous have an
exclusive legal right during life to control and profit from the commer-
cial use of their name and personality." 29
Under this analysis, giving celebrities the sole right to financially
exploit their identities is desirable, because it encourages the type of
achievement that makes one famous in the first place. This right adds
financial reward for persons to expend the time and resources necessary
to produce intellectual and creative works that have the potential to
bring one fame. The court argued that "[c]ertainly appellant Carson's
25. Id. at 832-33.
26. Id. at 836.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 835 (quoting Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980)).
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achievement has made him a celebrity which means that his identity has
a pecuniary value which the right of publicity should vindicate.""a
Conversely, the majority believed it was unjust that people who have
done nothing to help make the celebrity famous should be able to profit
from the celebrity's fame. The majority claimed that "[v]indication of
the right [of publicity] will also tend to prevent unjust enrichment by
persons such as appellee who seek commercially to exploit the identity of
celebrities without their consent."'" A celebrity's public identity, the
majority contended, may be appropriated in various ways.32 The major-
ity held, therefore, that there was no reason to limit actionable appropri-
ation only to circumstances in which a celebrity's name or likeness was
used, if other characteristics would identify him or her in the public eye.
Supporting this view, the majority cited several cases where the use
of various characteristics other than the plaintiff's name or likeness were
held to violate the plaintiff's right of publicity. In one case, Mot-
schenbacher v. Reynolds Tobacco Company,"3 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff, a famous race car driver, had his right of
publicity violated when an advertisement used a slightly altered picture
of his distinctive race car without his consent. In another, Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Sons, Inc., 34 the defendant was held to have violated a famous
retired athlete's right to publicity by using his nickname, "crazylegs," to
advertise a shaving gel for women. 5
Judge Cornelia Kennedy wrote a lengthy and well reasoned dissent
to the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Carson. She disagreed with the major-
ity's doctrinal innovation, its policy arguments, and its application of its
own test to the facts of the case.
The dissent first argued that, even using the majority's new formula-
tion of the right of publicity, the defendant's use of the phrase "Here's
Johnny" did not appropriate Carson's identity. The phrase had no con-
nection to Johnny Carson other than being his introduction on The To-
night Show. Judge Kennedy pointed out that "[t]he phrase is not said by
Johnny Carson, but said of him."3 6 She simply did not believe that the
30. Id. at 837; see also Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT SOC'Y 111, 116-22 (1980).
31. Carson, 698 F.2d at 837.
32. Id.
33. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
34. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
35. Id.; cf National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 540-41
(W.D. Tex. 1980) (use of the name "Heloise" in advertising for household products together
with a slogan "Heloise, Heroine of the Household" violated rights of Heloise Bamler, creator
of "Hints from Heloise," a newspaper column on housekeeping).
36. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 839 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 13:489
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words "Here's Johnny" were part of Carson's identity or could be con-
strued in any way as "belonging to" him. She explained that
Johnny Carson's fame as a comedian and talk show host is severable
from the phrase with which he is associated, "Here's Johnny." This
phrase is not Johnny Carson's "thumbprint"; it is not his work prod-
uct; it is not original; it is a common, simple combination of a direct
object, a contracted verb and a common first name; divorced from con-
text, it is two dimensional and ambiguous. It can hardly be said to be a
symbol or synthesis, i.e., a tangible "expression" of the "idea," of
Johnny Carson the comedian and talk show host .... 37
Rather than protecting the economic interests of Carson, Judge Kennedy
contended "the majority is awarding Johnny Carson a windfall."138
Moreover, the goal of encouraging the production of creative and
intellectual works was not served by giving Carson the exclusive right to
use the words "Here's Johnny," a phrase neither created nor performed
by him. Judge Kennedy pointed out that "the phrase contains nothing
personal to Carson in the sense of being caused by him or a product of
his time, effort and energies.",39 By gaining the exclusive right to use the
phrase, "Johnny Carson is simply reaping the rewards of the time, effort
and work product of others."'  In sum, the dissent argued, the phrase
was neither part of Carson's identity nor a product of his own efforts.
Thus defendant's use of the phrase violated neither the majority's new
test nor the principal purpose of the right of publicity doctrine.4'
In addition, and most significantly of all, Judge Kennedy disagreed
with the majority's new formulation of the right to publicity doctrine.
She argued that two countervailing policies opposed an excessively broad
definition of the right of publicity. First, a court should be restrained in
recognizing publicity rights, since "[p]rotection under the right of public-
ity confers a monopoly on the protected individual that is potentially
broader, offers fewer protections and potentially competes with federal
statutory monopolies [such as trademark or copyright]. 42 The monop-
oly on the use of items to which the right of publicity attaches is for the
public figure's entire life without being subject to governmental regula-
tion or limitation. Thus, expanding the protection afforded by the right
of publicity would run squarely counter to the federal policy of discour-
37. Id. at 844. Judge Kennedy pointed out that, "It cannot be claimed that Johnny Car-
son's appearances on 'The Tonight Show' are the only times at which a performer is intro-
duced with the phrase 'Here's - .' Numerous other performers are introduced with the
phrase 'Here's -,' using their first name, last name or full name." Id. at 838 n. 1.
38. Id. at 838.
39. Id. at 845.
40. Id. at 839.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 840.
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aging monopolies. 43 Moreover, a broadly defined "publicity right" mo-
nopoly provides virtually no notice to the public of what is claimed to be
protected. Thus the public is left to act at its peril, with the threat of a
potential lawsuit if an arguably "protected" item is used. "The result is a
chilling effect on commercial innovation and opportunity."
4
The dissent also contended that important free expression and first
amendment interests were harmed by an excessively broad definition of
what was protected by the right of publicity. Judge Kennedy pointed out
that "[s]trong federal policy permits the free use of intellectual property,
words and ideas that are in general circulation and not protected by a
valid copyright, patent or trademark."4 Removing items from the pub-
lic domain as a result of the operation of the right of publicity doctrine
contradicts this fundamental policy.
In addition, the dissent criticized the majority's approach as a form
of strict liability, imposing liability without fault on unsuspecting users of
anything protected. Judge Kennedy stated that "the majority's extension
of the right of publicity to phrases and other things merely associated
with an individual is not conditioned upon wrongdoing and would apply
with equal force in the case of an unknowing user."46
Because of these considerations, Judge Kennedy's dissenting opinion
proposed a balancing test to determine what characteristics, in addition
to name or likeness, should be protected by the right to publicity. She
wrote,
The right of publicity, whether tied to name, likeness, achievements,
identifying characteristics or actual performances, etc. conflicts with
the economic and expressive interests of others. Society's interests in
free enterprise and free expression must be balanced against the inter-
ests of an individual seeking protection in the right ofjublicity where
the right is being expanded beyond established limits.
Under this approach, the phrase "Here's Johnny" was not entitled to
protection since "the public's interest in free enterprise and free expres-
43. Monopolies are discouraged under federal law because of the basic public policy of
fostering free enterprise and the belief that monopolies are economically inefficient and disad-
vantageous to the consumer. See generally Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4
(1958); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
44. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 840 (6th Cir. 1983).
45. Id. at 841. Accord Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969); Sears Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
46. Carson, 698 F.2d at 839. The validity of using this argument to attack the majority's
approach seems doubtful, because the majority would only impose liability for intentional ap-
propriation of a celebrity's identity. See id. at 837.
47. Id. at 839.
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sion takes precedence over any interest Johnny Carson may have in a
phrase associated with his person."4
Carson is noteworthy because it so starkly presents the alternatives
available in determining the proper scope of right of publicity protection.
Once the certainty and clarity of the name or likeness test is abandoned,
defining the boundaries of the doctrine presents a clash of competing ba-
sic social policies. The dilemma of the rights of individuals to control the
use of their identities versus society's interests in free expression, as well
as the economic interests of creative industriousness, is presented in each
of the other decisions reviewed below.
B. Use of Vocal Impression: Midler v. Ford Motor Company
In Midler v. Ford Motor Company,49 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit conferred Carson-type protection in favor of another
celebrity, this time the prominent singer and actress, Bette Midler.
While the Midler court never used the phrase "right of publicity," it
plainly applied a publicity analysis in reaching its decision. The court
began its opinion by stating that "[t]his case centers on the protectability
of the voice of a celebrated chanteuse from commercial exploitation with-
out her consent." 50
The Midler case focused on an advertising campaign created by the
advertising agency Young & Rubicam, Inc. for the Ford Motor Com-
pany. In 1985, Young & Rubicam created a television advertising cam-
paign to sell Ford cars that aimed to make "an emotional connection
with Yuppies."51 The campaign centered around various popular songs
of the 1970s, with a different song in each commercial. The advertising
agency attempted to have the performer who initially popularized each
song to sing that song for the television commercial. When the original
performer was unwilling to do so, the agency had the songs performed by
48. Id. at 841. After the Sixth Circuit's Carson decision in 1983, the case was remanded
to the district court for a determination of appropriate relief. The district court awarded Car-
son over $30,000 in damages and enjoined the defendant from using the phrase "Here's
Johnny" anywhere in the Nation. The defendant appealed, arguing that the injunction should
be limited to Michigan, because it was unclear whether other states would recognize the broad
right of publicity enunciated by the Sixth Circuit to be Michigan law. Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987). The court of appeals rejected defendant's argu-
ments and held that a national injunction was proper "[B]ecause there are indications that
other states would hold as we have predicted Michigan would .... " Id. at 105. The court
explained that if the defendant sought to use the phrase in states where it believed such use
would not be prohibited, it could seek a modification of the injunction at that time. Id.
49. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).




so-called "sound alikes." 52 In the course of this campaign, the advertis-
ing agency wished to use a song originally performed by Bette Midler in
1973, entitled "Do You Want to Dance." Bette Midler did not own the
copyright, but the advertising agency contacted Midler's agent to inquire
if Midler would consent to the use of this song. Midler's agent informed
Young & Rubicam that she would not so consent.5
3
Young & Rubicam nevertheless proceeded with the commercial. It
decided to use another singer, Ula Hedwig, who had performed as a
backup singer, one of The Harlettes, for Midler in the past. In perform-
ing "Do You Want to Dance," Hedwig was instructed by Young &
Rubicam to "sound as much as possible like the Bette Midler record."54
Hedwig intentionally imitated Midler "to the best of her ability."55
Hedwig was successful: after the commercial was aired, a number of
people told Midler that the song in the commercial "sounded exactly"
like Midler's recording of "Do You Want to Dance." Hedwig likewise
was told by many friends that they thought it was Midler performing in
the commercial.56
Neither Bette Midler's name nor her picture was used in the com-
mercial, and Young & Rubicam had a license from the copyright holder
to use the song.5 7 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit noted, "At issue in this
case is only the protection of Midler's voice."58
Midler filed suit against both the advertising agency, Young & Rubi-
cam, and its client, Ford, in the U.S. District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California, claiming that the defendants had "irreparably
damaged" her reputation by producing and televising the commercial.59
The trial court, however, granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the suit. The court dismissed Midler's suit de-
spite its characterization of the defendants' conduct as that "of the aver-
age thief," and as an "[i]f we can't buy it, we'll take it" approach."°
Similar to the Carson trial court, the district court simply "believed that
52. Id.
53. Id. At trial, Ms. Midler explained her refusal to consent to the use of "Do You Want
to Dance" in a television commercial. "I don't do commercials," she stated. "I don't believe
in it. I resent people looking at the commercial and thinking that's me. They think I've sold
out." Anderson, Soundalike Suit, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 24.
54. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461. Only a few "aahs" deemed "unsuitable for the commercial"
were omitted. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 461-62.
57. Id. at 462.
58. Id.
59. Anderson, supra note 53, at 24.
60. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
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there was no legal principle preventing imitation of Midler's voice."'" It
apparently took the traditional view of limiting protection to appropria-
tion of name or likeness, neither of which were implicated here. Midler
appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
In an unanimous decision, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
reversed the trial court's order dismissing the suit and remanded the case
for trial. The court held that Midler stated a cause of action based on her
common law right to the protection of her identity-plainly a "right to
publicity" analysis. In reaching this decision, the court overcame several
hurdles-the first amendment, federal copyright law preemption, and
several California Civil Code provisions.
The Midler court first rejected the argument that the first amend-
ment protected the defendant's action. The court explained that "[t]he
purpose of the media's use of a person's identity is central. If the purpose
is 'informative or cultural' the use is immune; 'if it serves no such func-
tion but merely exploits the individual portrayed, immunity will not be
granted.' "62 Since Young & Rubicam used Midler's song for purely
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Fetcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayals of Real People by
the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1596 (1979)) (emphasis added). Fetcher and Rubin claimed
that, in the context of media portrayals, this distinction "account[s] for court decisions regard-
ing media portrayals more consistently than any rules that can be stated solely in terms of the
right of privacy and publicity." Id. Such an analysis, however, is overly simplistic at least
with respect to application of the "right to publicity" doctrine. If the court's main concern is
the purpose of appropriation, then all commercial appropriation would be actionable. Such an
approach begs the question. As the Felcher and Rubin article discusses, one must determine
whether "identity" has been appropriated in the first place. Id. Moreover, in certain contexts,
purely commercial exploitation of certain features of a celebrity's identity may in fact be wor-
thy of protection. See infra text accompanying notes 181-82.
Generally, however, courts refuse to find the right of publicity violated when the plain-
tiff's name or likeness is used in a dramatic performance or nonfictional work for commercial
or advertising purposes. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (the court,
applying Oregon law, found that film actress Ginger Rogers did not have a valid right of
publicity claim against producers of Ginger and Fred, a film about two fictional Italian cabaret
performers); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (fictional work
based on life of writer could not be basis of right of publicity action); Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concur-
ring) (right of publicity did not bar use of a celebrity's name not used to endorse a collateral
commercial product; television broadcast about Rudolph Valentino's life entitled Legend of
Valentino: A Romantic Fiction did not violate Valentino's right of publicity); Frosch v. Gros-
set & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 769, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (Right
of publicity did not bar the use of a celebrity's name in a title so long as the item was a literary
work and not "simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or serv-
ices."). But cf Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913) (dramatic portrayal
in motion picture of action of wireless operator involved in steamship collision violated New
York right of privacy statute).
Courts generally argue that fundamental free expression interests mandate this limitation.
Former Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court, concurring in Guglielmi, aptly
summed up the basis for this limitation on the doctrine as follows: "[P]rominence invites
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commercial motives, the court refused to confer first amendment immu-
nity on its actions.
creative comment. Surely the range of free expression would be meaningfully reduced if prom-
inent persons in the present and recent past were forbidden topics for the imaginations of
authors of fiction." 25 Cal. 3d at 869, 603 P.2d at 460, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 358 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
This distinction-that dramatic, informative, or cultural portrayals of an individual can-
not violate the right of publicity, while uses of identity only for commercial or advertising
purposes can violate the right of publicity-is logically flawed. Courts often justify this dis-
tinction by pointing out that only the exploitation of another's identity for financial gain as
with commercial advertising should be made actionable (e.g., using Johnny Carson to sell port-
able toilets). See, e.g., Frosch, 75 A.D.2d at 769, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 829. However, commercial
gain is also a motive for dramatic or nonfictional portrayals. The television network, film
studio, theater, or book publisher that shows or publishes the dramatic portrayal is motivated
by the desire to earn money as much as the toilet manufacturer in Carson or the automobile
manufacturer in Midler. Even the author of the nonfiction work or newspaper article which
uses a celebrity's identity hopes that the portrayal will generate income so that the author can
make a living.
This point was made in a special concurrence to the decision reached in Martin Luther
King, Jr., Center for Social Change, by Justice Welton of the Georgia Supreme Court, which
criticized the Georgia Supreme Court's recognition of the right of publicity doctrine. He dis-
agreed with the court's definition of the doctrine as use of another's name or likeness without
consent and for the "financial gain" of the appropriator. He commented as follows:
If "financial gain" is to be the watershed of violation vel non of this new-found
right, it cannot withstand scrutiny. It is rare, indeed, that any expression of senti-
ment beyond casual conversation is not somehow connected, directly or indirectly, to
"financial gain." For example, a school child wins a $25 prize for the best essay on
Dr. [Martin Luther] King's life. Is this "financial gain?" Must the child then ac-
count for the winnings?
The essay, because of its worth, is reprinted in a commercial publication. Must
the publisher account?
The publication is sold on the newsstand. Must the vendor account?
Obviously, the answers to the above questions will vary, and properly so, be-
cause the circumstances posited are vastly different. The dividing line, however, can-
not be fixed upon the presence or absence of "financial gain." Rather, it must be
grounded in the community's judgment of what, ex aeguo et bono, is unconscionable.
Were it otherwise, this "right of publicity," fully extended, would eliminate
scholarly research, historical analysis, and public comment, because food and shelter,
and the financial gain it takes to provide them, are still essentials of human existence.
Were it otherwise, no newspaper might identify any person or any incident of
his life without accounting to him for violation of his "right to publicity."
Were it otherwise, no author might refer to any event in history wherein his
reference is identifiable to any individual (or his heirs!) without accounting for his
royalties.
Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc.,
250 Ga. 135, 151, 296 S.E.2d 697, 708-09 (1982) (Weltner, J., concurring specially).
Justice Weltner's comments are well founded. It is not the presence of financial gain that
is decisive for the recognition of the right of publicity, but rather the court's judgment that
certain types of exploitation of identity are to be tolerated, and are indeed desirable-namely,
appropriation of a public figure's identity in a dramatic portrayal or a nonfictional work-
while exploitation of identity to sell a product or service unrelated to the public figure is not to
be permitted. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1356-58 (D.N.J. 1981).
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Neither did provisions of federal copyright law preempt Midler's
suit. As noted above, Young & Rubicam had obtained a license to use
the song from the copyright holder. Moreover, Midler was not claiming
that the song had obtained a secondary meaning, i.e., that it was uniquely
associated with her, nor was she attempting to prevent the defendants
from using the song. She was attempting only to protect her rendition of
the song, that is, the imitation of her voice. This court found this latter
point crucial.63 This plainly is a "right to publicity" analysis, even if not
identified as such. The court further ruled that such a claim could not be
preempted by federal copyright law, because a voice is not copyright-
able.' As the court pointed out, copyright law only protects "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."65 The
court held the sound of one's voice is not so fixed; thus a voice is not
copyrightable.66
The core of the Ninth Circuit decision was its attempt to move be-
yond the traditional strictures of the "right of publicity" tort to prevent
this use of Bette Midler's identity. The court held that Midler's claim for
relief could lie under a common law misappropriation theory. California
Civil Code § 3344, which afforded damages to a person injured by use of
his "name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness,"" was of no aid to
Midler simply because none of the attributes named in the statute were
used by the defendants. The voice used was Ms. Hedwig's, not Midler's,
and the term "likeness" referred only to visual image, not a vocal imita-
tion.68 However, the court ruled, this statute did "not preclude Midler
from pursuing any cause of action she may have at common law' 69 as its
remedies are merely "cumulative.' 0
63. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. The court noted that this case was different from Sinatra v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
In Sinatra, Nancy Sinatra sued Goodyear and Young & Rubicam for unfair competition for
using "These Boots Are Made For Walkin," a song she claimed had acquired "a secondary
meaning" and was thereby identified with her. Yet the defendants had obtained a license from
the song's copyright owner to use the song. Summary judgment was entered in favor of de-
fendants because recognition of Sinatra's claim would be contrary to federal copyright law. In
Midler, by contrast, the claim was not based on use of the song "Do You Want to Dance," nor
that the song had acquired a secondary meaning. Instead Midler claimed that the commercial
was an imitation of her voice, a form of misappropriation of her identity. 849 F.2d at 462.
64. 849 F.2d at 462.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
66. 849 F.2d at 462.
67. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering 1984 and Supp. 1991). For the complete text of
this statute, See Addendum I to this Article, infra p. 530.
68. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
69. Id.
70. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(g) (Deering 1984 and Supp. 1991). For the complete text of
this statute, See Addendum I to this Article, infra p. 530.
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Midler's only remaining cause of action was for appropriation of
common law property rights, recognized as a tort in California.71 The
court held that Midler made out such a cause of action based on the fact
that defendants "for their own profit in selling their product did appro-
priate part of her identity 72 and reversed the trial court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the defendants.
The court compared this case with the decision of the Ninth Circuit
fourteen years earlier in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Com-
pany. 3 In Motschenbacher, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the use of signs
and symbols on a racing car associated with a race car driver in an adver-
tisement without use of the driver's actual picture, was an actionable ap-
propriation of the attributes of the driver's identity, an appropriation that
"suggested" that the driver was appearing in the advertisement. "In the
same way," the court stated, "the defendants have used an imitation to
convey the impression that Midler was singing for them." 74
Plainly, Midler's voice was of value to the defendants-why else
would they have asked her to perform the song for them and, failing that,
why would they have "studiously acquired the services of a sound-alike
and instruct[ed] her to imitate Midler."75 Indeed, the court explained
that this attempted appropriation of Midler's voice was an effort to take
as intimate a part of Midler's identity as could be imagined:
A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face. The human voice is
one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested. We are all aware
that a friend is at once known by a few words on the phone. At a
philosophical level it has been observed that with the sound of a voice,
"the other stands before me." A fortiori, these observations hold true
of singing, especially singing by a singer of renown. The singer
manifests herself in the song. To impersonate her voice is to pirate her
identity.7
6
Therefore, the court concluded, what defendants "sought was an attri-
bute of Midler's identity."'77 This appropriation of an attribute of iden-
tity was actionable. The Ninth Circuit stated its holding as follows:
"when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and
71. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (citing Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498
F.2d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 1974)). In Motschenbacher, the Ninth Circuit held that California
common law recognizes an injury for the appropriation of one's identity. 498 F.2d at 825-26.
The Midler court also ruled that the tort of unfair competition was unavailable to Midler,
because Midler did not perform television commercials and thus was not in competition with
the defendants. 849 F.2d at 462-63.
72. Id. at 463-64.
73. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
74. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting D. IHDE, LISTENING AND VOICE 77 (1976)).
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deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropri-
ated what is not theirs and committed a tort in California., 7 8
In Midler, therefore, another court expanded protection for identity
beyond merely name or likeness protection. Although fully consistent
with the Carson majority's holding that the "right of publicity" is vio-
lated whenever the celebrity's identity is intentionally appropriated for
commercial purposes,79 the Ninth Circuit panel in Midler gave no con-
sideration to the competing interests noted by the dissent in Carson.
Completely absent from the decision is any consideration of the effects of
the Midler precedent on free expression and first amendment interests.
It is plain, however, that the singer's voice in Midler was more wor-
thy of protection than the slogan said by another about an entertainer in
Carson. Unlike "Here's Johnny," Midler created her distinctive voice
and performed it. Moreover, the defendants in Midler intentionally at-
tempted to appropriate this voice for their commercial ends, despite Mid-
ler's unwillingness to cooperate. Even had Midler applied the balancing
test of Judge Kennedy in Carson, it seems likely that the defendants'
conduct would have been actionable.
The essential significance of Midler demonstrates how far courts
have moved in their abandonment of the traditional name or likeness
test. In the face of a plain statute that did not include vocal imitation as
a form of actionable appropriation, the court ruled that the statute was
inapplicable and held imitation of a celebrity's voice in advertising to be
an actionable taking of an "attribute of identity."'
78. Id. The case was remanded for trial to the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California. Ms. Midler prevailed, and was awarded a $400,000 jury verdict against Young
& Rubicam. Anderson, supra note 53, at 24. At trial, the judge dismissed Ford Motor Com-
pany as a defendant due to insufficient evidence of an agency relationship linking Ford to
Young & Rubicam's tortious conduct. Id.
79. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983).
80. The Midler precedent recently was followed in a similar lawsuit brought by a singer,
Tom Waits. Waits filed suit against a manufacturer of corn chips alleging that they appropri-
ated his distinctive voice in a radio advertisement. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., No. 88-6478 (C.D.
Cal. 1990); see Cox, Beyond Bette Midler, National L.J., May 21, 1990, at 6. On May 8, 1990,
a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in Los Angeles awarded
Waits $2,475,000, an amount that included punitive damages. Id.
The Waits case appears to move beyond even Midler. While Waits' voice was imitated in
the advertising, the lyrics of one of his songs were not. Additionally, the defense's argument
that Waits was not sufficiently well-known to be unlawfully imitated failed. Id.
19911
C. Visual Impersonations as Misappropriation of Identity
Until this point, the case law discussed has interpreted the common-
law right of publicity."' However, several states have enacted privacy
statutes that attempt to specifically define the dimensions of what judges
call the "right of publicity" (i.e., the misappropriation of another's iden-
tity).8 2 These statutes (unlike California's) typically limit the cause of
action to the traditional confines of name or likeness appropriation. Such
legislative definition of the boundaries of misappropriation has not, how-
ever, halted the development of the case law. Indeed, in recent years
courts have continued to expand misappropriation protection beyond the
traditional limits of name or likeness appropriation under (or despite)
these statutes.
An important jurisdiction with such a statute is New York, which in
1903 enacted what is now codified as sections 50 and 51 of the New York
Civil Rights Law.8 a These sections provide both civil and criminal sanc-
tions for using "the name, portrait or picture of any living person" for
purposes of trade or advertising without having first received written
consent.84 As a result of this statute, the New York courts do not recog-
nize any common-law "right of publicity," but hold instead that an ac-
tion of this type is exclusively governed by the Civil Rights Law.8 5
1. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc.
Whether New York's apparently narrow statutory protection could
be extended beyond mere use of name or likeness was considered in
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc. 8 6 The plaintiff was Jacqueline
Kennedy Onassis, widow of both President John F. Kennedy and of Ar-
istotle Onassis, and "a well-known personality in her own right."87 She
sued the defendants, a clothing and cosmetic company (Christian Dior),
81. The Midler case ruled that the California statute did not apply to the vocal impersona-
tion at issue and instead applied a common-law analysis to determine if the impersonation was
actionable. The cases discussed in this section, by contrast, are governed by statute.
82. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976), § 51 (McKinney Supp.
1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1984 and Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08
(West 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1984). Sections 50-51 of the New York Civil Rights
Law are provided in full in Addendum II to this Article infra p. 532. Section 3344 of the
California Civil Code is provided in full in Addendum I to this Article, infra p.
83. See Addendum II to this Article, infra p. 532, for the complete text of these sections
and a brief discussion of their history.
84. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51.
85. See Stephano v. New Group Publications, 64 N.Y.2d 174, 182-83, 474 N.E.2d 580,
583-84, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223-24 (1984). Accord Pirone v. MacMillen, Inc., 894 F.2d 579,
585-86 (2d Cir. 1990).
86. 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984), aff'd mem., 110 A.D.2d 1095,
488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1985).
87. Id. at 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
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an advertising agency, a celebrity "look-alike" agency, a photographer,
and a model, in a New York state court over a magazine advertisement
for Dior merchandise that utilized, without Onassis's consent, a model
who closely resembled Onassis.
The advertisement at issue mixed fictional characters and real peo-
ple. It was a photograph of a group of people, entitled "Christian Dior:
Sportswear and Clothing for Men." Included in the photograph were
television personality Gene Shalit, model Shari Belafonte, and actress
Ruth Gordon. Also present was Barbara Reynolds, a woman who bore
"a remarkable resemblance to plaintiff Jacqueline Onassis." s The pho-
tograph depicted an elegant, extravagant, and stylish wedding, character-
ized as "a legendary private affair." The trial judge commented that
"[o]f course, what stamps it as 'legendary', is the presence of this eclectic
group, a frothy mix, the most legendary of which would clearly be Jac-
queline Kennedy Onassis, shown discretely behind Gordon and Shalit,
obviously delighted to be in attendance at this 'event.' ,9
The visual impersonation of Onassis "was no mere happenstance."
Instead, it was deliberate: the defendant advertising agency contacted
codefendant Ron Smith Celebrity Look-Alikes to provide someone who
could "pass for" Onassis.9 Dior reportedly spent $2.5 million on this ad
campaign. After the advertisement appeared, sales of Dior's merchan-
dise "went through the roof."91 Onassis's lawsuit alleged that the adver-
tisement violated her rights under the New York Civil Rights Law
sections 50 and 51 and her right to privacy, and she requested an injunc-
tion against future use of the advertisement.
The court recognized that Onassis's claim was governed by sections
50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, which grants a civil action to those
injured because of use of their "name, portrait or picture" without their
consent.92 As the court explained,
Plaintiff's name appears nowhere in the advertisement. Nevertheless,
the picture of a well-known personality, used in an ad and instantly
recognized, will still serve as a badge of approval for that commercial
product. It is designed to "catch the eye and focus it on the advertise-
ment." That is why the use of a person's "portrait or picture" without
consent is also proscribed. 93
88. Id. at 605, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
89. Id., 472 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
90. Id., 472 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
91. Id. at 606, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
92. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51. For the complete text of this section, see Addendum II
to this article, infra p. 532.
93. 122 Misc. 2d at 607, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (quoting Negri v. Scherig Corp., 333 F.
Supp. 101, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
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The court stated that the case therefore turned on whether, as a result of
its intentional visual impersonation, the advertisement could be consid-
ered to have used Onassis's "portrait or picture." A literal reading of the
statute implies that her portrait or picture was not so used, as Onassis
herself was not photographed in the advertisement.
However, after reviewing prior decisions construing the statute, the
court attempted to resolve this issue quite expansively. It held that "the
phrase 'portrait or picture' as used in [section] 51 of the Civil Rights Law
is not restricted to actual photographs, but comprises any representations
which are recognizable as likenesses of the complaining individual., 94
Turning to the specific facts of the case, the court held that the ad-
vertisement at issue violated the Civil Rights Law and granted Onassis's
motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining any further use of the ad-
vertisement. The court held that use of the model who resembled Onas-
sis in the advertisement created the illusion that Onassis actually
appeared in the advertisement and endorsed Dior's product.95 Crucial to
this illusion was "[t]he juxtaposition of the counterfeit figure [of Onassis]
just behind the real-life figures of a veteran actress, a [TV] personality,
and a well-known model."96 The advertisement was thus "deceptive
[and] promote[d] confusion"9 7 and was properly enjoined.
The court was not persuaded by the arguments of the Onassis
model, Barbara Reynolds, that her free expression rights and artistic ca-
reer would be harmed. All that Reynolds did was capitalize on her phys-
94. Id. at 608, N.Y.S. 2d at 259; see also Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (drawing of a naked black man in a boxing ring recognized as Muhammed Ali held to be
use of his "portrait or picture" in violation of N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51; Binns v.
Vitograph Co., 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913) (dramatic portrayal in motion picture by
one person to simulate another without his consent was forbidden by the statute); Loftus v.
Greenwich Lithograph Co., 192 A.D. 251, 182 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1920) (movie advertising poster
that included a sketch resembling plaintiff actress violated statute); Young v. Greneker Stu-
dios, Inc., 175 Misc. 1027, 26 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (the term "portrait or picture"
included a mannequin for which plaintiff was the model). But see Shaw v. Time & Life
Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975) (plaintiff bandleader de-
nied the right to make a claim against defendant for simulating the "sound" and style of
arrangement of his swing era band under N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51; Lombardo v.
Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)
(invasion of privacy action brought by bandleader Guy Lombardo against producer of a televi-
sion commercial showing an actor conducting a band at a New Year's Eve party playing
"Auld Lang Syne" in a style similar to that of the plaintiff was dismissed; plaintiff's name was
not mentioned, and the actor did not physically resemble the plaintiff); Toscani v. Hersey, 271
A.D. 445, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1946) (fictional book and play inspired by acts, events, and exper-
iences of a living person was not an unauthorized use of his "name, portrait or picture").
95. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup.
Ct. 1984), aff'd mem., 110 A.D.2d 1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1985).
96. Id. at 613, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
97. Id. at 612, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
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ical resemblance to Onassis; she did not create anything to achieve this
effect. "To paint a portrait of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis is to create a
work of art; to look like Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis is not."98 Reynolds
merely attempted to capitalize on her resemblance to Onassis for com-
mercial purposes. While she was free to appear as Onassis in dramatic
performances, the court held that doing so in the context of commercial
advertising violated the Civil Rights Law.
Finally, the court was not persuaded by the defendants' first amend-
ment arguments. It tersely stated that "[1]ittle more heed need be given
to the contention that somehow this advertisement is privileged as a pro-
tected form of free speech. It deals with the sale of goods, and not with
the promulgation of ideas."99 The court summarized its holding by stat-
ing that "[iln essence, this court finds ... that plaintiff's identity was
impermissibly misappropriated for the purposes of trade and advertising,
and that it makes no difference if the picture used to establish that iden-
tity was genuine or counterfeit.""
The fundamental significance of Onassis is that, faced with statutory
language that on its terms narrowly limited the misappropriation action
to a name or portrait, the Onassis court, as would courts in Carson and
Midler not so governed by statute, refused to so circumscribe the action.
The court held that
the principle to be distilled from a study of the statute and of the cases
construing it is that all persons, of whatever station in life, from the
relatively unknown to the world famous, are to be secured against ra-
pacious commercial exploitation. While the statute may not, by its
terms, cover voice or movement, character or style, it is intended to
protect the essence of the person, his or her identity or persona from
being unwillingly or unknowingly misappropriated for the profit of an-
other.... The essence of what is prohibited, as the statute, the cases,
and the dictionary definitions make clear, is the exploitation of one's
identity as that is conveyed verbally or graphically."'
Thus, the seemingly exact terms of a statute were reduced to protection
from exploitation of the "essence" of one's "identity." This, as we have
seen, was eventually the same result reached by the Sixth Circuit major-
98. Id. at 613, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
99. Id. at 614, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 262. The dismissal of defendant's first amendment argu-
ments, while consistent with the terms of New York's Civil Rights Law, completely ignored
the now well-established principle that commercial speech-speech aimed at the sale of goods
or services-is entitled to constitutional protection. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 12-15, at 890-904 (2d Ed. 1988). The Onassis decision thus either demonstrates a
surprising degree of ignorance by the trial judge, or illustrates the dangers, for free expression
interests, of a broad reading of a "right to publicity."
100. Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 615, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
101. Id. at 610-11, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 260-61 (emphasis added).
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ity in Carson a year earlier (a decision not cited in Onassis) and the Ninth
Circuit in Midler five years later (a decision that does not cite Onassis).
The court's paramount concern was preventing the exploitation of
the public figure's identity. It explained,
We are dealing here with actuality and appearance, where illusion
often heightens reality and all is not quite what it seems .... If we
truly value the right of privacy in a world of exploitation, where every
mark of distinctiveness becomes grist for the mills of publicity, then we
must give it more than lip service and grudging recognition. Let the
word go forth-there is no free ride. The commercial hitchhiker seek-
ing to travel on the fame of another will have to learn to pay the fare or
stand on his own two feet. 102
The court, however, attempted to reconcile this protection for identity
with the limits of the statute. "There are many aspects of identity," the
court pointed out. "A person may be known not only by objective indi-
cia-name, face, and social security number-but by other characteris-
tics as well-voice, movement, style, coiffure, typical phrases, as well as
by his or her history and accomplishments."' 1 3 However, the court held
that, in its Civil Rights Law, the New York legislature "accorded protec-
tion only to those aspects and identity embodied in name and face."'"
Nonetheless, the holding in Onassis is plainly an expansive reading
of the statutory protection afforded by a narrowly tailored statute. Once
again, the court expanded the misappropriation action beyond traditional
limits to protect the taking of "identity." In attempting to prevent ex-
ploitation of identity for commercial ends, the court felt justified to reach
out and broadly construe the statute to prevent "the commercial hitch-
hiker" from "travel[ling] on the fame of another."'0l 5
2 Allen v. National Video, Inc.
Allen v. National Video, Inc. '" presented a similar issue of visual
impersonation. Instead of the impersonation at issue being of the plain-
tiff however, it was of a fictional character that the plaintiff portrayed on
film.
Woody Allen, a noted comic actor and film director, sued National
Video, a video club, for using a Woody Allen impersonator to advertise
102. Id. at 612, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
103. Id., 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261. The court's implication that voice, movement, and style are
not "accomplishments" is not always tenable. Especially for entertainers, one's personal style
and similar characteristics may be the product of many years of effort to develop a public
persona recognizable and popular with the public. In this sense the public's recognition of
these characteristics are, for the entertainer, "accomplishments."
104. Id., 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
105. Id., 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
106. 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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membership in the club.1"7 The "celebrity impersonator," Phil Boroff,
whom plaintiff claimed was masquerading as Allen; portrayed a satisfied
holder of National Video's movie rental "V.I.P. card."' 08 Allen asserted
that the advertisement "appropriate[d] his face" and implied his endorse-
ment. Therefore, he argued, it violated his statutory right to privacy, his
right to publicity, and the Federal Lanham Act's prohibition against mis-
leading advertising. He filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, seeking both damages and injunctive
relief.
The advertisement in question plainly impersonated Allen. The ad-
vertisement contained a photograph that, in the words of the trial judge,
portrays a customer in a National Video store, an individual in his
forties, with a high forehead, tousled hair, and heavy black glasses.
The customer's elbow is on the counter, and his face, bearing an ex-
pression at once quizzical and somewhat smug, is leaning on his hand.
It is not disputed that, in general, the physical features and pose are
characteristic of plaintiff [Allen]. 109
Moreover, the advertisement pictured the impersonator with videotape
cassettes of Woody Allen films, Annie Hall and Bananas, as well as
Humphrey Bogart films that were associated with Allen as a result of a
character Allen portrayed in Play It Again Sam. 110 In addition to the
photograph, the advertisement contained the following words: "Become
a V.I.P. at National Video. We'll Make You Feel Like A Star." It added
that "you don't need a famous face to be treated to some pretty famous
service.""II
The defendants admitted that Boroff "was selected and posed as he
was to capitalize on his resemblance to [Woody Allen]," and that Boroff
had in the past offered his services as a look-alike for Allen. 1 2 Nor was
there any dispute that the photograph in question was used in the adver-
tisement for commercial purposes and that Allen did not give his consent
to the use of the photograph.
The advertisement was placed in Video Review, a trade magazine, as
well as on "countercards" distributed to National Video's franchisees.
The advertisement placed in Video Review contained a disclaimer that
stated: "celebrity double provided by Ron Smith's Celebrity Look-
107. The impersonator and the owner of the impersonator's talent agency were named as
defendants as well.
108. The trial judge commented that "[t]his case arises because plaintiff, to paraphrase
Groucho Marx, wouldn't belong to any video club that would have him as a member." Allen,
610 F. Supp. at 617.
109. Id. at 617-18.





Alike's, Los Angeles, California." No such disclaimer appeared on the
countercards. ' 13
Both plaintiff and defendants moved for summary judgment. The
defendants principally argued that since "Boroff merely appeared as
someone who looks like Woody Allen, but not as Woody Allen himself,
then plaintiff's rights were not violated." '114 As we have already seen, a
similar argument was to be found unavailing by the court in Midler.
Ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the court first
addressed Allen's privacy and publicity claims. The court explained that
to make out a violation of section 51 of the New York Civil Rights law
(the section authorizing a civil action), a plaintiff must satisfy three ele-
ments: 1) use of the plaintiff's name, portrait, or picture 2) for commer-
cial or trade purpose, 3) without plaintiff's written permission.' 15 The
court stated that the traditional "name or likeness" rule applied under
the Civil Rights Law: "Merely suggesting certain characteristics of the
plaintiff, without literally using his or her name, portrait or picture is not
actionable under the statute. '""I6 To make out a claim under the statute,
therefore, Allen had to show the advertisement appropriated his "name
or picture."
Woody Allen originally pleaded a common-law right of publicity
claim, but in light of the New York Court of Appeals' intervening ruling
in Stephans v. New Group Publications''7 that no common-law right of
publicity existed in New York, Allen moved to amend his complaint to
delete references to the common law as a source for the right of publicity.
The court granted the motion, stating that it would "treat plaintiff's
causes of action for privacy and publicity together under the general ru-
bric of privacy."" 8  The court stated that the only element required
under the common-law doctrine not required by the Civil Rights Law
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 621.
116. Id.; see, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 258 (1st Cir. 1962) (the court,
applying New York Law, found no statutory violation resulting from defendant's impersona-
tion of plaintiff Bert Lahr's distinctive voice in a television commercial); Wojtowicz v. De-
lacourte Press, 43 N.Y.2d 858, 374 N.E.2d 129, 403 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978) (no statutory
violation based on identifiable description of plaintiff in dramatization of a true story that did
not show her face or use her true name); Lombardo v. Doyle Dane & Birnbach, 58 A.D.2d
620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977) (no statutory violation resulting from recognizable depiction in a
television commercial of plaintiff Guy Lombardo's style of conducting "Auld Lang Syne" in a
New Year's Eve setting when plaintiff's name was not used and impersonator did not resemble
plaintiff).
117. 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984).
118. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 621.
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was that "plaintiff have cultivated a valuable property interest in his pub-
lic image"-a requirement "without question" satisfied here." 9
The court ruled that Allen sufficiently satisfied the last two of the
three elements necessary to make out a violation of the Civil Rights Law.
The only element in serious dispute was whether the photograph in the
advertisement was a "portrait or picture" of Allen.'20 Allen argued, as
did the plaintiffs in Carson and Midler, that his "portrait or picture" was
used as matter of law, because of the photograph's resemblance of him
or, at least, of a character he created in many films. He also claimed that
the props used identified him. In essence, he argued that his identity was
appropriated: "Plaintiff notes that it is not necessary that all persons
seeing the photograph actually identify him, only that he be identifiable
from the photograph."''
The court, however, was not persuaded. First, it pointed out, this
case differed from those cases in which actual photographs of the plaintiff
were used, and the issue in dispute was whether the pictures were too old
or too obscure to be recognizable as the plaintiff.'22 This case held a
closer resemblance, the court believed, to those cases holding that any
"recognizable likeness," not only an actual photograph, might be consid-
ered a "portrait or picture."' 23 Under these cases, the court stated, if
defendants had used a clearly recognizable painting or cartoon of plain-
tiff, this would constitute a "portrait or picture" under the Civil Rights
Law. 124
However, a "look-alike's" impersonation of a celebrity was different
and "more problematic," the court concluded. Unlike a printing or
drawing, the impersonator has his own identity and his own appearance.
"Plaintiff's privacy claim therefore requires the court to answer the al-
most metaphysical question of when one person's face, presented in a
certain context, becomes, as a matter of law, the face of another."' 25 The
court was concerned, moreover, with the interests of the impersonator: it
pointed out that any actor "has the right to exploit his or her own face
119. Id. at 621-22.
120. Id. at 622.
121. Id. (emphasis in original).
122. See, e.g., Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cohen v.
Herbal Concepts, 63 N.Y.2d 379, 382, 472 N.E.2d 307, 308, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457, 458 (1984).
123. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("clearly recogniza-
ble" drawing of Muhammad Ali portrayed as boxer, captioned "The Greatest", constitutes a
"portrait or picture" under statute); Young v. Grenecker Studios, Inc., 175 Misc. 1027, 1027,
26 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (Mannequin made in plaintiff's likeness was his "portrait
or picture").
124. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 622.
125. Id.
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for personal gain"-a right itself protected by the Civil Rights Law.' 26
In other words, the right of Allen to control the exploitation of his iden-
tity and the right of Boroff to make a living came into conflict, a conflict
the court would have to mediate in order to decide Allen's misappropria-
tion claim.
The court pointed out that under New York's statute Allen's inter-
est in exploiting his image might not weigh heavily. Instead, Allen's in-
terests were more properly considered under a "right of publikity"
theory, a right not recognized in New York. The court commented that
[u]nlike the Civil Rights Law provision, which is primarily designed to
compensate for the hurt feelings of private people who find their identi-
ties usurped for another's commercial gain, the right of publicity pro-
tects this property interest of the celebrity in his or her public
identity.... It is primarily this [latter] interest which Woody Allen
seeks to vindicate in the case at bar. 12 7
The court, therefore, was unwilling to grant Allen summary judg-
ment on his claim under the New York privacy statute. The court noted
that whether a photograph creates a recognizable likeness of a person is
ordinarily an issue of fact for the jury. For the court to grant summary
judgment in favor of Allen's claim, it must conclude that the photograph
in question "creates, as a matter of law, the illusion of Woody Allen's
actual presence in the advertisement." It concluded it could not find, as
a matter of law, that the photograph of Boroff in the advertisement was a
"portrait or picture" of Allen. 121
Several factors militated against summary adjudication of Allen's
misappropriation claim. First, the resemblance between Allen and
Boroff was not exact: "there are several physical differences between
plaintiff's face and that of defendant Boroff."' 29 Second, the image of
Allen presented by the photograph was that of his earlier works than
those of the time of the lawsuit, filed in 1984 and decided a year later.
The court noted that "the hair style and expression [of the look-alike in
the advertisement], while characteristics of the endearing 'schlemiel' em-
bodied by plaintiff in his earlier comic works, are out of step with plain-
tiff's post-'Annie Hall' appearance and the serious image and sober mien
that he has projected in recent years."' 130 Finally, the court stated that it
could not conclude that no reasonable jury might find that the photo-
graph was not of Allen. Although the advertisement plainly made "ref-
126. Id. at 623.
127. Id. at 621.
128. Id. at 623-24.
129. Id. at 624. The court commented that the advertising "photo shows larger eyebrows,
a wider face, and more uneven complexion than plaintiff's, and somewhat different glasses
than plaintiff generally wears." Id.
130. Id.
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erence" to Allen, it could not conclude that it contained Allen's portrait
or picture as required by the Civil Rights Law. 3 1
The court contrasted this case with the decision in Onassis v. Chris-
tian Dior-N. Y, Inc. 132 of a year earlier. As discussed above, 3 3 Onassis
held that, under the Civil Rights Law, it was sufficient to claim that the
overall impression created an image of the plaintiff appearing herself in
the advertisement, even if her own photograph had not been duplicated.
What was decisive in Onassis, the Allen court stated, was the "illusion"
that Onassis was present in the advertisement,'34 an illusion created by
juxtaposing the Onassis look-alike in one large photograph with several
actual celebrities. 35
The Allen court asserted that the Onassis decision was fully consis-
tent with the "portrait or picture" requirement of section 51 of the Civil
Rights Law. Because of the "illusion" created by the advertisement, the
advertisement implied that the look-alike was Onassis. The Allen court
stated that in that unique situation a look-alike could constitute a "por-
trait or picture" of the plaintiff. It concluded that "when, as in Onassis,
the look-alike seems indistinguishable from the real person and the con-
text of the advertisement clearly implies that he or she is the real celeb-
rity, a court may hold as a matter of law that the look-alike's face is a
'portrait or picture' of plaintiff." '36 In Allen, though, such was not the
case: the court held that it could not conclude, as a matter of law, that
the advertisement created the "illusion" that Allen was present.
Ultimately, however, the court evaded the necessity of holding that
Allen's Civil Rights Law claim failed by finding that Allen could obtain
the identical injunctive relief-an order precluding defendants from rep-
resenting that Boroff was actually Allen in advertising-under a novel
interpretation of section 1125(a) of the federal Lanham Act. 137 By grant-
131. Id.
132. 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984), aff'd mer., 100 A.D.2d 1095,
488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1985).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
134. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 613.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 623.
137. At the time of the Allen decision, this portion of the Lanham Act read as follows:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any
false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely
to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designa-
tion of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be trans-
ported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or
used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality
falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or
1991]
ing Allen summary judgment on his Lanham Act claim, the court ruled
that a resolution of Allen's privacy claim was unnecessary. 3 s
The court noted that the Lanham Act was not limited only to situa-
tions that constituted formal trademark infringement; it also applied to
"unfair competitive practices resulting in actual or potential decep-
tion." '39 The court pointed out that just as a trademark holder had an
important interest in maintaining the value and integrity of the trade-
mark, a celebrity had similar interests in his name or face. The court
explained,
A celebrity has a similar commercial investment in the "drawing
power" of his or her name and face in endorsing products and in mar-
keting a career. The celebrity's investment depends upon the good will
of the public, and infringement of the celebrity's rights also implicates
the public's interest in being free from deception when it relies on a
public figure's endorsement in an advertisement. The underlying pur-
poses of the Lanham Act therefore appear to be implicated in cases of
misrepresentations regarding the endorsement of goods and
services. 40
The court therefore held that "the unauthorized use of a person's name
or photograph in a manner that creates the false impression that the
by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). In 1988, this provision was amended. The amended statute pro-
vides as follows:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact,
or false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteris-
tics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services,
or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The new language in Section 1125(a)(1), which makes representa-
tions likely to cause confusion regarding the "sponsorship" or "approval" of goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person actionable, has interesting implications for the right
of publicity. A strong argument can be made that advertising that appropriates a person's
identity so as to imply that the person endorsed the product or service is unlawful under this
statute, despite the fact that the legislative history of the 1988 amendment does not discuss this
issue or mention that it had such a purpose. See S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5577, 5603-04. No reported decision
was found that construed this new language with respect to the right of publicity doctrine.
The 1988 amendment can be expected to become a source of right of publicity-type litigation
in the future.
138. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 624.
139. Id. at 625.
140. Id. at 625-26.
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party has endorsed a product or service in interstate commerce violates
the Lanham Act."'
141
Unlike the Civil Rights Law claim, Allen's claim under the federal
Lanham Act did not require that the court find that Allen's "portrait or
picture" had been used, only that the advertisement created the "likeli-
hood of consumer confusion" over whether Allen endorsed the prod-
uct.' 42 This standard, the court pointed out, is "broader than the strict
'portrait or picture' standard under the Civil Rights Law. Evocation of
plaintiff's general persona is not enough to make out a violation of sec-
tion 51, but it may create a likelihood of confusion under the Lanham
Act." '  The broader standard was justified, the court explained, be-
cause the purpose of the Lanham Act is the protection of the public's
interest in avoiding deception, not merely the protection of the plaintiff's
property interest in his face.'"
The court concluded that the plaintiff showed on the undisputed
facts, as a matter of law, that a likelihood of consumer confusion existed
as a result of the advertisement. 145 It, therefore, granted Allen's sum-
mary judgment motion on his Lanham Act claim and enjoined Boroff
from appearing in advertising that created the likelihood that a reason-
able person might believe that he was really Allen or that Allen had ap-
proved of Boroff's appearance. This injunction was national in scope. 146
The court, however, was sensitive to Boroff's own free expression rights
and his right to earn a living. The court held that Boroff could continue
to act as an Allen impersonator "in any setting [,including advertising,]
where the overall context makes it completely clear that he is a look-alike
and that plaintiff has nothing to do with the project."' 47
The trial judge was plainly uncomfortable, however, with her hold-
ing that the Civil Rights Law did not protect Allen and her consequent
necessity to engage in a novel reading of the Lanham Act. In significant
dicta, she echoed the concern that the Sixth Circuit majority in Carson
expressed about the traditional limits on "right of publicity," limits also
circumscribed by the Civil Rights Law. Chief Judge Motley noted,
Since the New York Court of Appeals has subsumed the common-law
right of publicity within the relatively narrow statutory requirements
of [s]ection 51, it may fall to the state legislature to fashion a workable
remedy to protect the pecuniary interests of celebrities in the market
value of their identities and to protect the public from the false impli-
141. Id. at 626.
142. Id. at 626-27.
143. Id. at 628.
144. Id. at 629.
145. Id. at 630.
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis in original).
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cation of endorsement. Controlling the use of a person's "portrait or
picture" may be sufficient to protect the feelings of private citizens, but
a broader statute modeled on the Lanham Act might provide fuller
protection for the interests threatened when a celebrity's endorsement
is implied without the use of an actual "portrait or picture."'
148
Woody Allen's effort to halt the appropriation of his identity in ad-
vertising did not end with Chief Judge Motley's 1985 decision in Allen v.
National Video, Inc. As one might have expected, Boroff continued to
impersonate Allen in advertising, albeit with a disclaimer as mandated by
Judge Motley. In April 1986, an advertisement appeared in the New
York newspaper Newsday for a clothing store, Men's World Outlet, Inc.,
in which Boroff appeared holding a clarinet. 149 Once again Boroff resem-
bled Allen and, in addition, "[t]he copy evoked the 'schlemiel' persona
Allen cultivated up through his appearance in Annie Hall." I5 o Below the
photograph of Boroff, in small type, the following statement appeared:
"This is a Ron Smith Celebrity Look-Alike."'
15 1
Allen attempted to re-open the prior lawsuit, and hold Boroff and
Ron Smith in contempt of Judge Motley's 1985 Order.5 2 The court re-
fused to hold Boroff or Smith in contempt. 53 While Judge Motley stated
that the Men's World advertisement was in "clear contempt" of the spirit
of her 1985 decision, she also "reluctantly" found that the advertisement
failed to violate the specific terms of the order.' 54 The advertisement, she
reasoned, did contain the disclaimer mandated by the order, albeit a
weak one, and the order did not specify any other manner by which
Boroff or Smith were to avoid the possibility of consumer confusion."'
However, the court amended its 1985 order to make it stronger and
more specific. Boroff was not to appear as a look-alike of Allen in adver-
tising unless the text of the advertisement, in bold face type equal in size
to the body of the advertising text, identified Boroff as a look-alike and
disclaimed any connection between Allen and the advertised product or
service. 1
56
148. Id. at 624 n.5.
149. Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The text of the Order is found at Allen v. National Video, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 2764
(CBM) (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1986) (Available on WESTLAW, 1986 WL 7270, NY-CS
database).
153. Allen, 679 F. Supp. at 362.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 362 n.3. Boroff also was to give a copy of the court's new order to all potential
clients wishing to use him as an Allen look-alike. The order also imposed the same restrictions
on Smith.
156. Id. at 362.
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This June 1986 order did not end the Woody Allen look-alike litiga-
tion. Allen next filed suit against Men's World and its advertising
agency, R&S. 117 As in the earlier litigation, Allen claimed, inter alia,
that the advertisement violated his rights under the Civil Rights Law
sections 50-51 and the federal Lanham Act. 58
After ruling that Allen's common-law unjust enrichment claim and
his claim under New York's General Business Law section 368-d, 59 were
"equivalent to a claim of violation of his right of publicity" and, there-
fore, must be dismissed as cognizable only under the Civil Rights Law,1"
Judge Motley addressed Allen's Civil Rights Law claim. In so doing, the
court reached the virtually identical result that it had reached in the first
Allen litigation.
Once again, the court ruled that it was not necessary to address
whether the Civil Rights Law had been violated-that is, whether the
photo of Boroff constituted a "portrait or picture" of Allen for the pur-
poses of the statute-because Allen would be entitled under the Lanham
Act to the relief that he sought.1 61 Citing the first Allen litigation, the
court held that the "use of Boroff's photograph in their advertisement
creat[ed] a likelihood of consumer confusion over plaintiff's endorsement
or involvement," 162 and it therefore granted Allen summary judgment
on his claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). While denying Allen's claim for
damages, the court granted Allen the same injunctive relief as it had in
the earlier A lien litigation. 163
The Allen and Onassis decisions are excellent examples of the defi-
ciencies of a strict "name or likeness" approach to right of publicity.
Even when confronted with statutes that limit protection to only these
two attributes, courts have begun to find ways to extend protection to
prevent takings of other attributes of identity."64 The state trial court in
Onassis even found a violation under section 51 the Civil Rights Law,
despite the fact that the public figure's name or actual picture had not
been used, on the grounds that the "illusion" had been created that she
appeared in the advertisement. Decisive to this holding was the Onassis
court's finding of appropriation of Ms. Onassis's identity.
157. Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
158. Id.
159. N.Y. GEN'L Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1988).
160. Allen, 679 F. Supp. at 367.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 370 (quoting Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 628 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
163. Id. at 372.
164. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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The court in Allen was not willing to go so far or to put such a
strained construction on section 51.165 It did however, "hesitate" to
deny Allen relief under the Civil Rights Law 166 and, as noted, sharply
criticized the statute for limiting protection to "portrait or picture." The
Allen court's solution, although itself not fully satisfactory either, is an
original construction of the Federal Lanham Act to sanction impersona-
tion that creates the likelihood of consumer confusion concerning a pub-
lic figure's endorsement. The problem left by such a "solution" is that
the Lanham Act is solely concerned with protecting the consumer from
confusion as to the source of a product, while the "right of publicity" is
concerned with public figures' rights to control attributes of their identity
and their need to protect those attributes from exploitation by others.
Making "likelihood of confusion" the standard may leave instances when
celebrities will not be able to control the commercial use of their identi-
ties. The limited relief granted in Allen is a good example. Boroff was
not enjoined from appearing as a Woody Allen look-alike in all contexts,
even in all advertising contexts, only from appearing without some form
of disclaimer or other means so that a reasonable person would not be-
lieve that he was actually Allen. Allen found, and may well continue to
find, that Boroff continues to exploit attributes of his identity to advertise
products. This prospect, in light of the example of "Here's Johnny Port-
able Toilets," cannot be expected to leave Allen without apprehension.
However, Allen and Onassis also show that even in the face of strict
statutes such as New York's, courts have begun to protect the uncon-
sented to use of attributes of a public figure's identity beyond name or
likeness, whether under the rubric of "right of publicity" or something
else. In general terms, then, these decisions are consistent with the Car-
son and Midler cases in their abandonment of the traditional boundaries
of name or likeness.
3. Nurmi v. Peterson
California has also enacted a statute which creates a civil action for
appropriation, specifically appropriation of name, voice, signature, pho-
tograph, or likeness. 67 Unlike New York's statute, the statutory cause
of action does not eliminate the common-law right of publicity action;
instead, the statute's remedies are expressly stated to be cumulative.1 61
Nurmi v. Peterson, an impersonation case, was partially decided under
165. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 624.
166. Id.
167. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering 1984 and Supp. 1991). For the complete text of
this statute, see Addendum I to this Article, infra p. 530.
168. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(g) (Deering 1984 and Supp. 1991).
169. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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this statute, and it reached a different result from Onassis and Allen. This
lawsuit concerned an alleged imitation of a television character created
by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff was a 1950s television movie hostess who created and
performed a character called "Vampira." This character wore a distinc-
tive dark dress, horror movie props, and maintained a special vampire-
like personality. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants, actress Casan-
dra Peterson and affiliated marketing, management, and broadcasting
firms, contacted her in 1981 to seek to recreate her character for contem-
porary audiences.17 Negotiations between the parties to reach an agree-
ment regarding use of the character failed. 171
The plaintiff further alleged that the defendants then created a char-
acter, "Elvira," based on plaintiff's "Vampira." Elvira became a success-
ful character on television and in films, leading to a number of
merchandising spin-offs. The plaintiff brought suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California alleging that the defendants
violated the California right of publicity statute, the common-law rights
of publicity and privacy, and section 43(a) of the Federal Lanham Act. 172
The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all of the plain-
tiff's right to privacy and publicity claims, both statutory and common
law. 173 First, the court dismissed the claims under California Civil Code
section 3344, which grants a cause of action against anyone who know-
ingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness. The
court ruled that the defendants had not appropriated the plaintiff's "like-
ness," the plaintiff did not allege that the Elvira character was created to
look exactly like plaintiff's Vampira. Indeed the plaintiff only argued
that Elvira was similar to the props, clothes, and mannerisms of
Vampira. 174 The court held that "likeness" was to be construed to mean
an "exact replication of [another] person's features." 175
170. Id. at 1776.
171. Id.
172. Id.; section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
173. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1776. The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims for punitive
damages under the Lanham Act, ruling that the Lanham Act does not permit punitive dam-
age. Id. at 1778-79.
174. Id. at 1777.
175. Id. The court stated that this definition of "likeness" was consistent with the Midler
court's interpretation of the same statute. Midler had ruled that use of a voice imitating the
plaintiff's singing style was not actionable under section 3344 since the plaintiff's actual voice
was not used. Id. (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988)). As
the Nurmi court recognized, however, Midler did not directly construe the meaning of "like-
ness" in section 3344, holding that the term did not apply, because "likeness" was limited to
visual images and not to voices. Id. at n.2.
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The court rejected the plaintiff's view that "likeness" is appropri-
ated if the defendants created a character that bore an "approximate re-
semblance" to the plaintiff's character. This interpretation of likeness
would simply foreclose too much expression, as the court explained,
Under the plaintiff's definition, if a person merely were to wear an-
other's clothes or emulate another's mannerisms, an action would lie
under section 3344 because a "likeness" was being appropriated.
However, such a definition would expand section 3344 to freeze all
rights to certain props, clothing, or other qualities surrounding a char-
acter with the first person to portray a given part. In effect, all subse-
quent actors would be subject to legal challenge on the grounds that
they had copied elements of characters portrayed by earlier genera-
tions of actors. This result would greatly inhibit the development of
the entertainment arts and the freedom of expression, a result the
[c]ourt finds cannot have been intended-by the California legislature in
drafting section 3344. 176
The court's dismissal of the plaintiff's common-law right of public-
ity claim' 77 was based on a similarly narrow construction of the tort. In
sharp contrast to the other recent decisions reviewed, the court decided
the right of publicity claim in completely traditional terms: "To main-
tain a right of publicity claim, a plaintiff must show that his or her name
or likeness was appropriated without consent."' 178 Once again, "like-
ness" was not appropriated because the defendants did not "copy ex-
actly" the Vampira character. Instead, the court explained,
The defendants are alleged to have created a new character that resem-
bled the Vampira character but which used a different name and em-
ployed a different actress in the lead role. The [c]ourt finds that
because these allegations do not amount to the claim that the plain-
tiff's actual features were used by the defendants for commercial pur-
poses, no common[-]law right of publicity or privacy action can be
maintained. 179
The court contrasted this case to Midler. In Midler, the court
pointed out, the advertiser attempted to defraud the public into thinking
that Bette Midler actually performed the song and then endorsed the
product. In Nurmi, there was no "fraudulent attempt to deceive the pub-
lic into believing that the plaintiff[] [was] actually present."' 80
The Nurmi decision is notable because it is a rare example of a re-
cent decision applying a strict name or likeness standard. However, the
plaintiff in Nurmi was attempting to protect a fictional character from
appropriation, rather than her own identity. Although the issue of the
176. Id. at 1777-78.
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appropriation of a fictional character was never discussed as such by the
court, and the court did not expressly base its decision on this distinction,
the court's reluctance to find the defendant's "appropriation" actionable
seems in large part to be due to this fact. To the extent that "Elvira" is
merely a updated "Vampira," this decision warrants criticism because it
allowed the defendants to appropriate the work of the plaintiff without
compensating her. Nurmi, then, demonstrates that the name or likeness
approach, while generally discredited and rarely applied today, has not
been completely discarded.
II
Alternative Approaches to Protecting Identity from
Misappropriation
A. The Deficiencies of Broad Protection for Identity
This review of developments in the case law shows that the protec-
tion offered by the right of publicity generally continues to expand be-
yond name or likeness. No consensus has yet emerged on the proper
boundaries of the doctrine. It is, however, possible to distill the case law
into several alternative approaches.
An examination of the developing case law reveals essentially three
possible alternative doctrinal approaches for determining what the right
of publicity protects. First, the traditional Restatement rule, relied on by
the trial courts in Carson and Nurmi and essentially adopted in New
York in the Civil Rights Law (though now falling into disfavor), only
protects the public figure's "name or likeness" from appropriation. Sec-
ond is the approach of the Carson court of appeals majority and the
Ninth Circuit in Midler, which considerably broadens the protection to
cover any appropriation of a person's "identity" without that person's
consent. The third alternative is what could be called the middle ground
proposed by the dissenting judge in Carson: the protection may extend
beyond merely a public figure's name or likeness, but only if a balancing
test is satisfied so that the interests of the person seeking protection out-
weigh society's interests in free expression and free enterprise. This third
approach was also essentially adopted by the Allen trial court, in light of
the limited nature of the relief granted, albeit in the guise of an applica-
tion of the Federal Lanham Act.
Determining which, if any, of these three approaches is the proper
one to follow in right of privacy cases ultimately depends on which poli-
cies one wishes to advance. Clearly the Carson majority correctly identi-
fied the basic policy rationale for the existence of a right of publicity in
the first place: the desire to give public figures the sole right to commer-
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cially exploit their identities. This right, as previously discussed, oper-
ates as an incentive and reward for creative achievement and as a way of
preventing those who have nothing to do with celebrities' achievements
from profiting from them. 181 Thus, the right of publicity, in essence, is a
property right, the property being a celebrity's public image and
identity. 182
Since it is the celebrity's identity that is protected, the developing
case law correctly holds that the right of publicity should protect more
than a person's name or likeness. Undoubtedly, a celebrity's public iden-
tity can be appropriated without using the celebrity's name or picture,
and there is no principled basis for ending protection at that point.'
Therefore, even though it has the advantages of relative certainty and
ease of application, 8 4 the Restatement rule is unsatisfactory because it
remains too narrow. In fact, even the Restatement itself recognizes that
"[t]he interest protected by the rule ... is the interest of the individual in
the exclusive use of his identity."' 8 Likewise, Professor Prosser com-
mented that "[iut is the plaintiff's name as a symbol of his identity that is
involved [in the right of publicity doctrine], and not as a mere name."186
While citing it as the established approach, he also expressed some
doubts about the "name and likeness" rule. In a footnote to his famous
treatise, he stated that "it is not impossible that, in the absence of a limit-
ing statute, there might be invasion of privacy by appropriation of the
plaintiff's identity, as by impersonation, without the use of either his
name or his likeness." 8 7 The experience of New York courts in applying
a statute virtually identical to the Restatement rule conclusively demon-
181. The United States Supreme Court has commented that right of publicity protection
"provides an economic incentive for [the person protected] to make the investment required to
produce a performance of interest to the public." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Brdcst. Co., 433
U.S. 562, 576 (1977). In the words of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, "It is a form of commer-
cial immorality to 'reap where another has sown.'" Hirsch v. S.L. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90
Wis. 2d 379, 392, 280 N.W.2d 129, 135 (1979) (quoting Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Eco-
nomic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 176, 218 N.W.2d 705, 711 (1974)).
182. The right of publicity confers "something analogous to a property right upon the
individual." RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652A comment b. Courts have also held the
right of publicity to be a property right. See, Note, supra note 7, at 527 (citing Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d
1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969).
183. For example, a radio commercial narrated by a person with a voice that sounds like a
celebrity with a distinctive voice would seem to appropriate the celebrity's identity without
using his name or likeness. See supra text accompanying note 79.
184. However, as the Nurmi case demonstrated, there could be problems in determining
what constitutes a "likeness" even under the Restatement rule.
185. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652C comment a (emphasis added).
186. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 117.
187. Id. § 117 at 851 n.20; see also W. PROSSER, supra note 2.
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strates that courts, as Prosser expected, have come to recognize the defi-
ciencies of the "name or likeness" approach.
The right of publicity also operates to protect more than just the
celebrity's interest in protecting the use of the celebrity's identity. It also
helps prevent public confusion resulting from advertising. This second
objective, in fact, formed the basis of the court's holding in Allen. Under
a broad Carson-type protection, only with the celebrity's consent may an
advertiser use a celebrity to promote a product. Therefore, whenever a
potential consumer sees a celebrity used to advertise a product, the con-
sumer knows that the celebrity consented, presumably implying that the
celebrity endorses the product's quality. Thus, the right of publicity ac-
tually serves two important objectives: protecting the celebrity's identity
from misappropriation and protecting the public from deceptive advertis-
ing that falsely implies a celebrity's endorsement.
Important reasons exist, however, for one to be cautious about advo-
cating an overly expansive protection for "identity" under the right of
publicity rubric. First, the argument that the recognition of the right of
publicity offers an "incentive for achievement" may not always be well
founded. A public figure may not have achieved anything to become
famous or may have become well known through bad deeds. A good
example of the latter is an infamous criminal, such as John Dillinger in
the 1930s or John Hinckley in 1981. These people should not be able to
file suit against the use of their identity in an advertising campaign (for
example, to advertise burglar alarms) and to claim that control of their
public identities is their reward for "achieving" criminal fame, unless one
wishes to encourage criminal behavior. Furthermore, some particular at-
tribute of a public figure's identity may not have been created or in any
sense achieved by that person. The dissenting judge in Carson found this
a persuasive reason for criticizing the majority's protection of the phrase
"Here's Johnny"; she believed that Carson neither created nor performed
the phrase.""' For these reasons, protecting all aspects of a public fig-
ure's identity cannot always be justified.
There are other considerations that militate against too broad of a
definition of what is protected by the right of publicity. The Carson ma-
jority 8 9 claimed using a celebrity's identity to promote a product with-
out his or her consent allows the advertiser to profit by exploiting
another's achievements with which the advertiser had nothing to do, and
is thus a form of "unjust enrichment."' 9' Similar reasoning followed to
protect other attributes of identity from appropriation in each of the
188. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 839 (6th Cir. 1983).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 21-35.
190. Carson, 698 F.2d at 833.
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other decisions reviewed, with the exception of Nurmi. However, when
not merely using a celebrity's name or picture but instead something as-
sociated with his identity, the advertiser may have worked very hard, and
with much creativity, to use that characteristic to promote the product.
One person's unjust enrichment is another's clever advertising campaign.
The law, through the right of publicity doctrine, should not necessarily
in every case penalize one who creates the advertisement by using a char-
acteristic associated with a celebrity. The advertiser in fact may be more
creative than the celebrity.
Another problem with a broad Carson majority-type approach is
that, while it appears simple on its face, it may not be easy to apply.
Determining whether a particular characteristic is part of a public fig-
ure's identity often may be difficult. Indeed in Carson, the four federal
judges considering this issue split two to two. 9'
One final consideration implicated by the Carson decision, a consid-
eration that some might argue made the right to publicity protection in-
apt in the particular circumstances of the Carson case, but which the
dissent did not address, was that Carson did not seek relief merely be-
cause the defendant made a profit from using his identity. Rather, the
real reason that he filed suit was undoubtedly because he was embar-
rassed by the use of "Here's Johnny" to advertise a portable toilet.
Needless to say, one does not maintain an esteemed public image by ad-
vertising a toilet. If this is correct, if Carson really sued due to embar-
rassment, the basic justification for the right of publicity-to protect
celebrities' financial interests in the exploitation of their identities-was
not served by the doctrine's application in this case. Other invasion of
privacy interests may have been implicated, however. 192
191. A good example of this difficulty is the once popular television commercial of the mid-
1980s for a chain of hamburger restaurants that featured the phrase "Where's the beef?" The
actress who uttered those words in the commercial might claim, in a manner similar to Johnny
Carson, that the phrase became part of her public identity through the wide exposure of the
commercial; and thus, she had the exclusive right to further commercially exploit that phrase.
Whether "Where's the beef?" was really part of her "identity" (rather than a creation of the
advertising copywriters) would plainly be quite difficult for a court to determine.
192. If this interpretation of Carson's motives for filing suit is correct, invasion of privacy
rather than right of publicity was the more appropriate rubric in which the court should have
considered Carson's claim. In claims not founded on an invasion of the right of publicity,
"essentially the injury is a mental one in terms of embarrassment, humiliation, and hurt feel-
ings." Note, supra note 7, at 533. However, with respect to the right of publicity,
When a celebrity's name or picture is appropriated for use in advertising or for pur-
poses of trade, an entirely different injury is inflicted .... [I]t is ludicrous to suggest
that the vast majority of entertainers, for example, experience embarrassment or hu-
miliation when their names or images are publicized. Rather, in most cases publicity
is desired inasmuch as a celebrity's income may be directly proportionate to his or
her degree of fame.
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Right of publicity cases often present a choice between protecting
the rights of advertisers or the rights of celebrities. Underlying the right
of publicity doctrine, as the recent case law demonstrates, is essentially
the protection of one particular status group--celebrities. Only those
persons with a publicly known identity can have their identity used in a
way that is commercially beneficial to others. The Carson majority im-
plicitly admits this basic function of the doctrine when they state, "the
right to publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest of
celebrities in their identities."' 93 Although the Carson majority would
probably disagree,194 courts should not always choose to protect the ce-
lebrity by applying the right of publicity doctrine when an advertiser uses
something associated with the celebrity's identity.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the Carson major-
ity's rule, that the right of publicity protects against any commercial ap-
propriation of any aspect of a celebrity's identity, is too broad. In some
circumstances, an aspect of the celebrity's identity may not warrant pro-
tection. The fundamental problem with an overly broad right of public-
ity doctrine, as Judge Kennedy in dissent in Carson correctly pointed
out, is that the "extension of the right of publicity to include phrases or
other things [that] are merely associated with the individual permits a
popular entertainer or public figure, by associating himself or herself
with a common phrase, to remove those words from the public do-
main."' 5 Right of publicity protection, unlike the statutory monopolies
of copyright and trademark, creates a monopoly unlimited in duration
and unregulated by statute. Our society encourages free expression, both
for its own sake and also to assist free competition in the marketplace.
By removing the protected items from the public domain, the extension
of the right of publicity protection beyond a celebrity's name or picture
contradicts these basic societal values.' 96 Determining the proper scope
of the right of publicity doctrine, then, presents the familiar situation in
tort law of the interest of the individual conflicting with the interests of
society at large.' 97
Id. However, unless it alters the measure of damages, there is little practical difference be-
tween the categories of the actions.
193. Carson, 698 F.2d at 835 (emphasis added).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 21-35.
195. Carson, 698 F.2d at 837.
196. See Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 151, 296 S.E.2d 697, 708 (1982) (Weltner, J., concurring specially)
(criticizing concept of right of publicity as "an open-ended and ill-defined force which jeopar-
dizes a right of unquestioned authenticity-free speech.").
197. The interests of the public figure and of society do not conflict in all respects under the
right of publicity doctrine, however. Since creative and artistic achievements enrich society, to
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B. The Proper Scope of the Protection of Identity
A review of the recent development and growth of the right of pub-
licity doctrine leads to a somewhat contradictory conclusion. While the
doctrine now quite properly extends beyond its original formulation of
protecting merely name or likeness, its continued growth also has the
dangerous potential to swallow large amounts of commercial expression
and grant windfall protection to public figures of attributes that are not
clearly parts of the celebrity's identity. Plainly, "name or likeness" is an
insufficient definition of what should be protected by right of publicity.
On the other hand, an overly simplistic Carson-type protection for any
"attribute" of "identity" sweeps too broadly. A new and more carefully
crafted formulation of the doctrine is needed, if for no other reason than
that this doctrine will otherwise likely continue to spawn extensive litiga-
tion with often inconsistent results.
The basic approach to determining what should properly be pro-
tected by the right of publicity is best accomplished in the context of a
case-by-case balancing of factors, similar to the approach advocated by
the dissenting judge in Carson. That is, public figures' interests in control
over the commercial exploitation of their identities should be balanced
against the public interest in free expression and avoidance of monopo-
lies. While such a balancing test always brings into question the criticism
of uncertainty in application, in this context it is more responsive to the
conflicting fundamental interests implicated by the right of publicity.
The following criteria ought to be examined in such an analysis.
First, one should examine whether the attribute at issue truly identifies
the celebrity. That is, the first inquiry should be as follows: Would an
average citizen exposed to the attributes or characteristics at issue believe
that the public figure was present? Second, whether the public figure was
responsible for the creation of the attribute at issue should be considered.
The less the public figure had to do with the creation of the identifying
characteristic, or the less it actually protects the public figure, the less
worthy it is of protection. Third, whether the attribute itself is deserving
of protection should be determined by considering whether the attribute
is a product of creative effort and achievement or is merely a result of a
fortuity or of a "negative" achievement.
Fourth, on the other side of the scale, the creative content of the use
of identity and the likelihood of causing public confusion regarding a
celebrity's endorsement should be scrutinized. Thus, a highly creative
and artistic visual impersonation of a celebrity should be viewed much
the extent that the right of publicity actually has the effect of encouraging such achievements,
the doctrine serves societal as well as individual interests.
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more favorably than a simple appropriation of name or likeness. Dis-
claimers similar to those ordered by the court in Allen should also be
used to reduce the risk of consumer confusion. Likewise, whether the
advertiser's intent was to confuse the public into believing in the presence
of the celebrity is relevant.
III
Conclusion
Recent developments in the case law demonstrate, if nothing else,
the difficulty of formulating a proper doctrinal approach to define exactly
what is protected by the right of publicity. This difficulty occurs because
the right of publicity implicates two important and often conflicting poli-
cies: the interest of public figures in the commercial exploitation of their
identities and society's interest in free expression and the avoidance of
monopolies. The traditional Restatement rule is too narrow because the
identifying characteristics of a public figure may encompass more than
name or likeness. On the other hand, the "identity" rule of Carson and
Midler, that any unauthorized use of anything associated with a public
figure's identity is actionable, appears excessively broad. It may protect
characteristics not really deserving of protection, while ignoring free ex-
pression interests. Because it is responsive to both basic policies, an ap-
proach that balances the interest in the exclusive use of their identities
against the public interest in free creative expression is the best method of
determining whether right of publicity protection is warranted.
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Addendum I to Bloom Article
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1984 and Supp. 1991).
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signa-
ture, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, mer-
chandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, with-
out such person's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior
consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addi-
tion, in any action brought under this section, the person who violated
the section shall be liable to the injured party or parties in the amount
equal to the greater of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual
damages suffered by him or her as a result of the unauthorized use, and
any profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use
and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In
establishing such profits, the injured party or parties are required to
present proof only of the gross revenue attributable to such use and the
person who violated this section is required to provide his or her de-
ductible expenses. Punitive damages may also be awarded to the in-
jured party or parties. The prevailing party in any action under this
section shall also be entitled to attorney's fees and costs.
(b) As used in this section, "photograph" means any photograph
or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape or live
television transmission, of any person such that the person is readily
identifiable.
(1) A person shall be deemed to be readily identifiable from a
photograph when one who views the photograph with the naked eye
can reasonably determine that the person depicted in the photograph is
the same person who is complaining of its unauthorized use.
(2) If the photograph includes more than one person so identifi-
able, then the person or persons complaining of the use shall be repre-
sented as individuals rather than solely as members of a definable
group represented in the photograph. A definable group includes, but
is not limited to, the following examples: a crowd at any sporting
event, a crowd in any street or public building, the audience at any
theatrical or stage production, a glee club, or a baseball team.
(3) A person or persons shall be considered to be represented as
members of a definable group if they are represented in the photograph
solely as a result of being present at the time the photograph was taken
and have not been singled out as individuals in any manner.
(c) Where a photograph or likeness of an employee of the person
using the photograph or likeness appearing in the advertisement or
other publication prepared by or in behalf of the user is only inciden-
tal, and not essential, to the purpose of the publication in which it
appears, there shall arise a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden
of producing evidence that the failure to obtain the consent of the em-
ployee was not a knowing use of the employee's photograph or
likeness.
(d) For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or
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sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not con-
stitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a).
(e) The use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in
a commercial medium shall not constitute a use for which consent is
required under subdivision (a) solely because the material containing
such use is commercially sponsored or contains paid advertising.
Rather it shall be a question of fact whether or not the use of the per-
son's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness was so directly
connected with the commercial sponsorship or with the paid advertis-
ing as to constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivi-
sion (a).
(f) Nothing in this section shall apply to the owners or employees
of any medium used for advertising, including, but not limited to,
newspapers, magazines, radio and television networks and stations,
cable television systems, billboards, and transit ads, by whom any ad-
vertisement or solicitation in violation of this section is published or
disseminated, unless it is established that such owners or employees
had knowledge of the unauthorized use of the person's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness as prohibited by this section.
(g) The remedies provided for in this section are cumulative and
shall be in addition to any others provided for by law.
1991]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
Addendum II to Bloom Article
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976),
§ 51 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
[§ 50] A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising pur-
poses, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any
living person without having first obtained the written consent of such
person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
[§ 51] Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within
this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without
the written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an
equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the person,
firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to prevent
and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for
any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall
have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such
manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by section fifty of
this article, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages.
But nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent
any person, firm or corporation from selling or otherwise transferring
any material containing such name, portrait or picture in whatever me-
dium to any user of such name, portrait or picture, or to any third
party for sale or transfer directly or indirectly to such a user, for use in
a manner lawful under this article, nothing contained in this article
shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation,
practicing the profession of photography, from exhibiting in or about
his or its establishment specimens of the work of such establishment,
unless the same is continued by such person, firm or corporation after
written notice objecting thereto has been given by the person por-
trayed; and nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to
prevent any person, firm or corporation from using the name, portrait
or picture of any manufacturer or dealer in connection with the goods,
wares and merchandise manufactured, produced or dealt in by him
which he has sold or disposed of with such name, portrait or picture of
any author, composer or artist in connection with his literary, musical
or artistic productions which he has sold or disposed of with such
name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith.
These statutory provisions were enacted in 1903 after the New York
Court of Appeals ruled that New York did not recognize an action for
the misappropriation of name or likeness. Robertson v. Rochester Fold-
ing Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). The Robertson court
held that recognizing such an action would lead to "a vast amount of
litigation" and that only the legislature could create such a doctrine. Id.
at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
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